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On June 1st, 1951, the Secretary General of the Nigerian Trade Union of
Agricultural and Forestry Workers, Ilio Bosi, addressed a letter to the head
of the World Federation of Trade Unions, the Frenchman Louis Saillant,
with a concrete request. After thanking him for the scholarships Nigerians
had been granted by East Germany, Bosi praised the work of his fellow
trade unionist Nduka Eze and asked for a scholarship that would allow Eze
to pursue his studies “in the School of Political Sciences and Economics of
Moscow University.”1 The letter reached Moscow soon afterwards yet, as
was the case with other similar early African requests, this one was not
met with approval. The issue of scholarships was repeatedly raised by dele-
gations from colonial Africa, which had started visiting the USSR, after the
death of Joseph Stalin (1953), the Soviet endorsement of the Bandung
Conference (1955) and of the Afro-Asian movement. Nevertheless, as his-
torians Apollon Davidson and Sergey Mazov (1999: 158-168, 324-327) have
documented, the decisions to foster political and cultural ties with Sub-
Saharan Africa and to offer Africans scholarships for study at Soviet univer-
sities were taken by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) only
between 1958 and 1959, and implemented without delay. In September
1960, the famous Peoples’ Friendship University (Universitet Druzˇby Narodov,
hereafter “UDN”), a school reserved for students from “developing countries,”
opened its doors in Moscow and welcomed 179 Africans, as well as
231 Asians, 182 Latin Americans, and 60 more students from the countries
of the Middle East. In February 1961, it was renamed “Patrice Lumumba”
after the late Congolese leader.
Symbolically and, in many respects, literally, the creation of the UDN-
Patrice Lumumba University ushered in a new era of Soviet-African and,
more broadly, of Soviet-Third World relations. Educational aid to Africa,
on which this paper concentrates, became a major part of the overall Soviet
developmental aid. Provided either by the UDN and numerous other schools
1. State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereafter GARF), f. (fond means collec-
tion) 5451, op. (opis’ is inventory) 45, d. (delo is file) 503, l. (list means page)
40-43.
Cahiers d’Études africaines, LVII (2), 226, 2017, pp. 259-287.
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in the USSR, or, to a lesser extent, through the creation of educational centers
and the dispatch of Soviet professors to Africa, this aid was meant to put
into practice Leninist principles of solidarity with the “oppressed countries”
and the “oppressed classes,” both victims of Western imperialism. As the
First Secretary of the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev proclaimed at the opening
ceremony of the UDN that the Soviet Union “sympathized with the aims of
Asian, African, and Latin American peoples to develop their economies and
to train their own engineers, agronomists, doctors, and scientists” (MID SSSR
1963: 83). Besides internationalist proclamations, powerful ideological
and geopolitical considerations motivated “the Soviet cultural offensive”
(Barghoorn 1960: 188-225), whose goal was ultimately to create a socialist-
minded and pro-Soviet intelligentsia in the postcolonial world. The out-
come, in terms of students’ training, was particularly significant. From
1960 to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, more than 43,500
students from Sub-Saharan Africa received post-secondary education in the
motherland of socialism, the overwhelming majority studied in universities
and higher technological or medical schools. Throughout the Cold War,
the USSR thus became a major host country for African students, competing
with and even outdoing a former colonial power such as the United King-
dom (see Appendix) by welcoming more students.
At the same time, the Soviet cultural offensive did not remain unan-
swered. Mainly in response to the communist threat, former colonial powers,
as well as the United States, Canada and other developed capitalist countries
offered developmental aid and dramatically increased the number of scholar-
ships for Third World students (Lindsay 1989; Bu 2003; Unger 2011).
Training the new elites, who would hold key positions in the state or party
mechanisms and play a pivotal role in the economic affairs and political
orientation of their countries, became a crucial objective of policy-makers
in the North. Not without concern, Frantz Fanon captured the immediate
consequence of the Western and Eastern interest in African and Asian elites
in the following words: “The governing classes and students of underdevel-
oped countries are gold mines for airline companies,” he commented and
added: “African and Asian officials may in the same month follow a course
on socialist planning in Moscow and one on the advantages of liberal econ-
omy in London or at Columbia University” (Fanon 1963: 83). The phenom-
enon was part of what the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had
famously described as a peaceful “battle” between the East and the West “for
the hearts and minds” of postcolonial peoples. The training of new elites
epitomized this battle. With decolonization, higher education became one
of the most important issues in the international cultural politics of the
global Cold War (Laïdi 1986; Hobsbawm 1994; Westad 2007; Leffler &
Westad 2010). The engagement of Western and Eastern countries either
directly, or through international organizations, as well as the commitment
and enthusiasm of the less developed ones, contributed to the expansion of
education in the Third World and played a major role in what sociologists
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of education later described as a “world educational revolution” (Meyer et al.
1977; Boli et al. 1985; Fiala & Lanford 1987).
The Soviet Union’s cooperation with Africa was one of the most impor-
tant chapters of the global education revolution. This paper reopens this
chapter. It is based mainly on documents from Soviet ministries, universi-
ties, party and state bodies, which became accessible to researchers after
the post-1989 “archival revolution,” yet whose importance with regards to
the history of postcolonial Africa has not as yet been assessed. The paper
maintains that the birth, the content, and the life-cycle of the Soviet-African
cooperation, whose core was the Soviet aid African countries were receiving
almost entirely as a grant, clearly bore the imprint of the Soviet experience
and worldview, of the Cold War rivalry, and of the political circumstances
sketched out above. At the same time it insists that it also bore the imprint
of Africa. African political parties, student organizations, trade unions and
cultural societies successfully promoted their cause and benefitted from the
aid of the USSR and of other socialist countries. Thousands of students received
scholarships, graduated from first-class universities and embarked on careers
that changed their lives. African governments, finally, although from the
position as beneficiaries, managed to impose restrictions on the donors’
policies, to advance their agendas and to maximize their benefits. As this
paper will argue, within a few years of its inception, and despite some
tensions due to Soviet admission policies or to the teaching of Marxism-
Leninism, the educational exchange became a “normal,” effective and pre-
dominantly state-to-state cooperation. The effects of this cooperation in
terms of elites’ training are presented throughout the paper, while its overall
impact on Africa is discussed in the conclusion.
Visions and Policies of Soviet-African Educational Cooperation
If with decolonization, education became a prominent issue on the Soviet
African agenda, it was, first and foremost, a prominent issue on the agendas
of Africans. “The citizens of Africa see in education a means by which their
aspirations may be met” and “they are willing to sacrifice for the attainment
of this means for gaining economic and social development,” stated the
delegates who attended the Addis Ababa Conference of African States on
the Development of Education in Africa in May 1961 in their Final Report
(UNESCO 1961: 3). As Assié-Lumumba (2006) has argued, African leaders
were indeed committed to “sacrifice,” that is, to invest as much as possible
in education. This was not only in response to domestic demands, but also
because they were genuinely convinced that investment in education would
bring economic development and modernization to their countries, as many
prominent theorists were then preaching. The training of African professors,
engineers, managers, and other specialists was undoubtedly a prerequisite for
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economic development and, for the more radical, a prerequisite for the nation-
alization of foreign companies. “Nationalization” of human resources, i.e.,
the substitution of foreigners with Africans, constituted thus a “noble” politi-
cal, economic and cultural goal and Soviet experience in that field, according
to the prominent Nigerien militant and scientist Abdou Moumouni (1998:
258-259), was particularly relevant. These were all empowering aspira-
tions, but in the meantime, the reality was that economic and human resour-
ces, money and elites, were clearly missing, which made civil cooperation
with developed countries urgently needed.
Under those circumstances, most African countries and especially those
which had proclaimed their faith in a version of socialism more or less
inspired by foreign examples, signed cultural agreements with the USSR and
placed strong emphasis on educational matters. Egypt became the first
African country to sign such an agreement in 1957 in order to send students
to the USSR and to invite a group of seven Soviet professors to teach at the
Suez Oil Institute. Guinea, Mali and Ghana followed suit. In Guinea,
between 1960 and 1964, the USSR established the Polytechnic Institute of
Conakry, with four faculties of engineering and an enrollment capacity of
300 students per year. In Mali, between 1963 and 1966, the Soviets also
founded the Higher Administrative School of Bamako with an enrollment
capacity of 250 students per year, future civil servants for the friendly regime
of Modibo Keita, as well as a school of medical assistants and a center for
agricultural training. All these schools were created with low-interest Soviet
loans, which were quickly rescheduled and later written-off. Although they
remained ill equipped and understaffed (Bartenev 2007), both the Conakry
Institute and the Bamako School became the first higher education institu-
tions in Guinea and Mali respectively and constituted landmarks in Soviet-
African cooperation. In 1964, in response to a request from the Algerian
government, the USSR created the African Center of Hydrocarbons and Tex-
tiles in Boumerdes, as a gift to Algeria. The Center, which was comprised
of the Oil and Gas Institute and a Textile School, became one of the most
successful Soviet educational undertakings in the noncommunist world and
the only one to host a sizeable community of Soviet professors.2 In 1960,
the government of Patrice Lumumba had also expressed the wish to employ
1,500 Soviet teachers and professors with knowledge of French in the Republic
of Congo. This wish, however, never materialized.3
2. In 1980, there were 935 Soviet professors teaching in Algeria and almost one-
third of these at the African Center of Hydrocarbons and Textile. See the report
of the Soviet Ministry of Higher and Secondary Technical Education: GARF, f.
9606, op. 1, d. 9120, l. 25-29.
3. It was extremely difficult, in the early 1960s, to find even a handful of Soviet
professors with good knowledge of foreign languages. Soviet professors sent
to Africa were thus always accompanied by interpreters, generally one interpreter
for every seven to ten professors, the time to learn French or English on the spot.
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Apart from the radical African governments, most Western-oriented ones
also welcomed Soviet educational and technical assistance. Between 1960
and 1963, for instance, the USSR created the Bahir Dar Technical Institute
as a gift to Haile Selassie’s Ethiopia. In 1968, the Soviets constructed
and equipped the National Engineering School of Tunisia. Both countries
however refrained from employing Soviet professors, something that pro-
voked frustration on the Soviet side. Frustration with these costly commit-
ments and with the failure to establish permanent ties through the presence
of Soviet teaching staff led the CPSU to almost halt the construction of educa-
tional institutes in Africa and, by the end of the 1960s, to concentrate on
the training of African students in the USSR.4 The offer of scholarships for
studies in the USSR was seen then with suspicion by several Western-oriented
governments, at least during the early sixties, when they were reluctant to
send students. For young African candidates, however, it was rather an
extraordinary opportunity to receive higher education. And for some, it
seemed to be a real chance to realize their dream and to study in the “in
the motherland of socialism.”
Fascination with the ideology, the international policies, and the techno-
logical achievements of the USSR was widespread among African youth. In
his broad survey of the opinions, worldview and aspirations of African stu-
dents in France, the Senegalese sociologist Jean-Pierre N’Diaye (1962: 228-
229, 243-245) found that 25% of the students admired the USSR, 20%
admired China, 12.4% Israel, 12% Cuba and 8% France, while the United
States was lagging far behind with only 3.3% of positive responses. The
reasons underpinning their admiration for the USSR were the rapid Soviet
progress in all areas (35%), communist ideology (22.3%) and scientific
achievements (18.5%) such as the Sputnik and Lunik satellites. Accord-
ingly, 37.8% of the students believed that “full-fledged socialism” consti-
tuted the best economic system for the development of Africa. N’Diaye’s
colleague, the French sociologist Pierre Fougeyrollas (1967: 156), conducted
similar research among his African students at the University of Dakar to
find that the USSR was not in first, but in third place, among the countries
which were considered as “models,” behind France and Switzerland. Third
This was a serious handicap for the Soviet cooperation with African countries.
For the demand of the Congolese government, see the report of 27/01/1961 of
the Soviet State Committee for Cultural Exchange with Foreign Countries:
GARF, f. R-9518, op. 1, d. 585, l. 121.
4. Algeria was an exception. Oil-rich, eager to diversify its foreign partnerships
and at the same time satisfied with its cooperation with the USSR, the country
continued buying low-cost Soviet educational services. During the 1970s, the
USSR created the National Institute of Light Industry in Boumerdes and the
Institute of Mining and Smelting at the University of Annaba. Besides, as Fahim
Qubain (1966: 104-105) had earlier noticed, several Arab countries were impor-
ting laboratory equipment from the USSR, East Germany or other socialist coun-
tries because it was 50 or even 70% cheaper than the Western equipment, and
also because they could often purchase it on a barter basis.
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or first, the USSR was genuinely admired, something that the thousands of
letters Africans were sending to various Soviet organizations clearly demon-
strate. The achievements of the cosmonauts Yuri Gagarin and German
Titov were celebrated by the Uganda National Congress Youth Organiza-
tion,5 the Committee of Rural Youth of Togo,6 the Madagascar-USSR friend-
ship association,7 and by numerous African youngsters, who were applying
for scholarships in order to study at universities that, in their eyes, had
produced the Soviet technological miracle.
African radical organizations, political parties and trade unions, were
also looking East for aid and education. Besides training executives at
political schools, they were also requesting scholarships for ordinary univer-
sity students, members of the party or of its youth branch. The leaders of
the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC), Félix Moumié and Ernest
Ouandié, as well as Jacques N’Gom, their opponent and Secretary General
of the Union générale des travailleurs kamerunais (UGTK), had been among
the first to make such requests and to reap the rewards.8 Bakary Djibo,
the leader of the left-wing Sawaba party of Niger, was requesting as many
scholarships as possible and sending long lists of prospective students to
Moscow.9 The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape
Verde (PAIGC) also relied on Soviet educational aid and its leader, Amilcar
Cabral, was closely following up on his students.10
Soviet Scholarships and African Beneficiaries
Eager to cultivate ties and to expand their influence, the Soviets offered
scholarships to three groups of recipients. The first was the group of gov-
ernments, mainly the left-leaning ones, although Western-oriented govern-
ments were not at all excluded. The Soviet Ministry of Education granted
these “state scholarships” to the Ghanaian, Ethiopian or Nigerian ministries,
5. Letter sent to the Chairman of the Soviet Association for Friendship with the
peoples of Africa (SADNA) by A. O. Seyonga on behalf of the Uganda Youth
Organization, Cairo, 15/09/1959: GARF, f. 9576, op. 12, d. 40, l. 70.
6. Letter sent to the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace by F. Toula, Pre-
sident & J. Amegboh, Secretary General of the Togolese committee, Lomé,
14/08/1961: GARF, f. 9539, op. 1, d. 866, l. 2-3.
7. Letter sent to the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Exchange with
Foreign Countries by the Madagascar-USSR association, Tananarive, 15/09/1959:
GARF, f. 9576, op. 12, d. 40, l. 34.
8. See, for instance, Jacques N’Gom to L. Soloviev, Secretary of the Central Coun-
cil of Trade Unions, Yaoundé, 29/07/1960: GARF, f. 5451, op. 45, d. 1559, l. 9.
9. Bakary Djibo to M. Bakhitov 13/05/1961 and Bakhitov to Djibo, Moscow
13/06/1961. Bakhitov was secretary of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Com-
mittee: GARF, f. 9540, op. 1, d. 110, l. 112-114 and l. 124.
10. See Cabral’s correspondence with the Soviet Committee of Youth Organizations
on issues of scholarships and students, see: RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 3, d. 28, l. 79
et 658, d. 29, l. 61, d. 33, l. 67-68, d. 348, l. 157-158, d. 584, l. 48-54.
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which in turn were selecting future students. Only rarely did some African
governments pay a small number of scholarships in addition to the scholar-
ships granted by the USSR. Egypt was the only country to systematically
pay one-third of the monthly stipend for the majority of Egyptian students.
The second group was comprised of anticolonial parties of Southern and
Portuguese Africa, such as the PAIGC, which were fighting for independence.
The third group included African anti-governmental parties, social, cultural
and other officially non-governmental organizations from countries with
which the USSR maintained diplomatic relations and most often also cultural
cooperation. The second and third groups were not offered state scholar-
ships, but rather subventions from Soviet social, cultural and political orga-
nizations, which, in theory, were acting independently from the Soviet
government. Included among these were organizations such as the Soviet
Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (SKSSAA), the Committee of Youth Organi-
zations (KMO), the Union of Societies for Friendship and Cultural Exchange
with Foreign Countries (SSOD) and the Central Council of Trade Unions
(VTSPS).11 From the 1960s to the 1980s, the scholarships offered by way
of such organizations made up approximately 25% of all Soviet scholar-
ships. In 1985-1986, for instance, 5,288 of the 22,863 students from the
entire African continent held scholarships granted through these organiza-
tions.12 In the second and third groups too, African recipients were select-
ing the future students from among their members, while the Soviets had
little influence.
The UDN-Lumumba University, whose founding members had been the
four Soviet organizations mentioned above, was par excellence a school
recruiting the majority of its students through the channel of Soviet and
African organizations and parties (second and third groups), namely with
political criteria. In 1965-1966, for instance, 36 of the 152 UDN scholarships
intended for Africa were offered to Oginga Odinga—who was in fact still in
government—for the “progressive” members of the Kenya African National
Union (KANU). Furthermore, 20 scholarships were offered to various left-
leaning Nigerian organizations, such as the Nigerian Youth Congress and
the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria (SWAFP), 6 to the Parti
progressiste and to the student union from Dahomey studying at the UDN,
5 to the UPC and to the Cameroonian Student Union of the UDN, 5 to the
Sawaba, 5 to the Parti africain de l’indépendance (PAI) and 8 to parties
fighting against Portuguese rule. The distribution of scholarships to Arab,
Asian and Latin American students was similar.13 It was thus absolutely
11. SKSSAA was the Sovetskij Komitet Solidarnosti so Stranami Azii I Afriki,
KMO, the Komitet Molode~nyh organizacij, SSOD, the Soiuz Obsˇestv Druzˇbyi
Kul’turnoj Svjazi s Zarubzˇymi Stranami and VCSPS, the Vsesoiuznyi Central’nyi
Sovet Professional’nyh Soiuzov.
12. Annual report of the Soviet Ministry of Education based on data of January 1,
1986: GARF, f. 9606, op. 3, d. 984, l. 9.
13. See the plan of admissions: GARF, f. 9606, op. 2, d. 177, l. 2-7.
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true that during the 1960s the Lumumba was hosting mainly communist
and leftist students, something that undoubtedly damaged its reputation
(Rubinstein 1971; Koudawo 1992).
The complete picture was, at the same time, much more complex and
this was true for two main reasons. First, a number of Africans attending
the UDN were not members of anti-governmental parties, but students selected
directly by African governments. Second, students recruited through radi-
cal parties and pro-Soviet organizations (not necessarily anti-governmental
ones) were attending not only the UDN, but tens of ordinary Soviet schools.
In 1965-1966 again, besides the UDN scholarships, Soviet organizations dis-
bursed at least 240 scholarships for various African parties, student and
trade unions, while the number of state scholarships (first group) was more
than 1,000.14 Finally, as reflected by those numbers, for all its importance
during the 1960s, the UDN was but one center for the training of African
(and Third World) students. Besides the UDN, the overwhelming majority
of students were studying in Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Leningrad and other
prestigious universities, medical and technological institutes or in technical
schools. Among the 20,000 black Africans who, in the second half of the
1980s, were enrolled in Soviet schools, only 5% were at the UDN. In many
respects, this development reflected the expansion of state-to-state cooperation.
Yet if most African governments welcomed Soviet aid, neither the
Western-oriented, nor the radical ones approved of the distribution of schol-
arships to opposition parties and organizations. The third group of recipi-
ents was perceived as a threat by African regimes. In August 1961, the
government of Somalia announced to the Soviet ambassador that all scholar-
ships for Somalis should be transferred to a special office in charge of
educational exchange and the government of Kwame Nkrumah did the same
in 1962.15 Interestingly, it was Nkrumah’s government which distrusted
the unofficial recruitment channels, but which was simultaneously issuing
Ghanaian passports for Nigerians and other Africans who had been granted
scholarships by Soviet organizations. Nigeria, too, created an office for
educational exchange and issued recurrent verbal warnings targeting both
the Soviet organizations and the UDN. In addition to their protests, African
countries increased border controls and warned all “clandestine” students
that their diplomas would not be recognized. Last but not least, the strength-
ening of the one-party and gatekeeper states (Bayart 1989; Cooper 2002)
14. It should be noted, however, that the 240 scholarships of the organizations and
the 1,000 state scholarships were for the entire continent and not only for Sub-
Saharan Africa. See “Information on the distribution of scholarships by the
Soviet social organizations to foreign organizations,” KMO, no date: Russian
State Archive of Social and Political History (hereafter RGASPI), f. M-3, op. 3,
d. 33, l. 153-154.
15. Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Somalia, 16/08/1961, copy
in Russian: GARF, f. R-9576, op. 14, d. 44, l. 182-183. Letter from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Ghana, 06/11/1962, and a copy in Russian of a Ghanaian
Note of 26/03/1963: GARF, f. R-9576, op. 14, d. 58, l. 6 and 18.
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and their emulation of Soviet techniques of government under the guise of
the socialist modernization (Copans 1984), in reality meant a crackdown
on opposition parties, independent organizations and trade unions, which
benefitted from Soviet aid, and their substitution by state-controlled entities
and by party infrastructure. These developments had very tangible effects
on the recruitment of students because scholarships intended for independent
African organizations were ending up at state and party offices. The Soviet
Minister of Education, Viatcheslav Elioutin, stated in 1965: “The selection
of candidates for a scholarship of social organizations in Morocco, Nigeria,
Somalia, Kenya and certain other countries is made by the governments of
those countries and, as a result, offering social scholarships makes little
sense.”16 The “government filter,” as it was called in Moscow, in practice
meant that often there was little difference between the 25 and the 75% of
students who held social and state scholarships respectively. It also meant
that African governments had managed to impose their policy in favor of
the state-to-state cooperation.
The USSR never gave up recruiting communists and sympathizers. Yet
it also came to terms with the new reality for several reasons. Above all,
Moscow sought to avoid damaging its relationship with friendly regimes
whose “socialist” practices it had to respect, as well as to avoid vindicating
the suspicions of Western-oriented countries. Instead, in order to dissipate
suspicion, the Soviet authorities provided African embassies with lists of
almost all the names of their nationals and asked the “clandestine” students
to present themselves to their embassies in order to legalize their situation.
Another reason behind the Soviets’ accommodation to the new circumstan-
ces was their disappointment with many students who had been selected by
leftist organizations and notably with those recommended by youth unions
based in the West. The Ugandan Andrew Richard Amar, for instance, who,
after he was expelled from the USSR, wrote the acrimonious testimony An
African in the USSR (Amar 1961), had been recommended by Dennis
Phombeah, the Secretary General of the West African Students Union (WASU)
and the Committee of African Organizations of the United Kingdom.17 The
Senegalese Ibrahima Konaté, founder of a Pan-African union in Kiev and
torchbearer of protests against racism, had been Secretary of the Fédération
des étudiants d’Afrique noire en France (FEANF).18 Another former FEANF
militant was the Dahomean Léopold Agboton, student at Moscow State Uni-
versity (MGU) until he was expelled in April 1966, Secretary General of the
16. “On the distribution of scholarships of Soviet social organizations in foreign
countries” draft of a Decision, 01/05/1965: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46, d. 395, l. 27.
17. Phombeah’s letter of October 6, 1959 to Professor Ivan Potekhin of the SKSSAA:
GARF, f. 9576, op. 12, d. 40, l. 152.
18. On Konaté, see a Komsomol report of 29/05/1964: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46,
d. 403, l. 81-82.
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Union of African Students in Europe (UASE), Maoist and, according to all
accounts, the most disturbing youth leader.19 Finally, by cooperating with
African states, instead of recruiting blindly dubious sympathizers, some of
whom were also bad students, the Soviets managed to drastically reduce
the drop-out rate and to elevate the overall academic standard. Training
good specialists, the future African elites, was, after all, a major objective
of Soviet civil aid. Making them socialists and friends of the USSR was, of
course, the other major task the CPSU had entrusted to Soviet universities and
organizations.
The Training of Students in the USSR
A reader of Andrew Amar’s memoirs and of other contemporary accounts
may arguably assume that the Soviet hosts were obsessed with the indoctri-
nation of students coming from non-communist countries. Perfectly fitting
into the powerful Cold War mindset, this assumption, however, is not accu-
rate. Until October 1968, all courses of political and social sciences, whose
aim was indeed to inculcate Marxism-Leninism in the minds of students,
were optional for all students from non-communist countries with the excep-
tion of those who were enrolled in faculties of social and political sciences.
But given the huge burden the students had both at the preparatory and the
specialized faculties in order to learn Russian and, for many of them, to
catch up with the required academic level, and given the unpopularity of
the courses in question, most students did not attend classes. Even those
who were instructed by their parties or governments to do so usually diso-
beyed or, simply, did not sit for exams. As a result, class attendance in
several schools in Moscow and Leningrad oscillated between 25 and 50%
(Katsakioris 2015: 204-205).
Aside from the discontent of Soviet faculty members and students, reac-
tions also came from socialist African countries. The ambassador of Mali
in Moscow attended the annual congress of Malian students in January 1965
and urged them to take the elective courses.20 A couple of months before,
the secretary for ideological questions of the Ghanaian Convention People’s
Party, Kweku Akwei, angry about the poor political education of Ghanaians,
expressed the following remarks to the officials at the Soviet Ministry of
Education: “It is inconceivable for us that in the country of Marxism and
of socialism our students are exempted from the study of social and political
disciplines and that often they know much less about Marxism than our
students in Manchester.” Akwei added: “You say that you give the students
19. On Agboton and his expulsion, see the Decision of 23/04/1966 of the Vice-Minister
of Education, N. Sofinskij: GARF, f. 9606, op. 2, d. 223, l. 45.
20. Report on the Malian students, 29/04/1965: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46, d. 403, l. 75.
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the right to decide whether to study Marxism or not. We do not agree
with this. And we are not interested in what the students prefer.”21
The Soviets were also particularly frustrated with the Africans students,
many of whom had staged anti-Soviet protests and expressed pro-Chinese
or even pro-Western views (Hessler 2006; Matusevich 2008). Attributing
these phenomena to their “petit bourgeois” worldview and their poor politi-
cal education, the Ministry of Education decided, in October 1968, to make
the attendance of political and ideological courses compulsory.22 From that
moment on and until the curriculum reform undertaken in 1989 with the
blessing of Mikhail Gorbachev, students had to follow such courses as the
“History of the CPSU,” the “Principles of Scientific Communism,” “Political
Economy” and “Scientific Atheism” (Rajaonesa 1994: 108-109). If the 1968
decision implicitly acknowledged the failure to attract students to the optional
courses, its effects in terms of indoctrination should nevertheless not be
overemphasized. The teaching of the non-ideological scientific disciplines
remained by far the most important task of the faculty members in all insti-
tutes and universities. Indeed, the students who had a tough schedule and
did not welcome the additional burden, according to all sources and accounts,
were by far more concerned with concentrating on the main subjects, rather
than on the ideological courses they had to take as requirements.
Studies in the USSR were longer than in the West for two main reasons.
The first was that students had to spend one year and a few of them a
second one at a preparatory faculty to learn Russian and take courses related
to their specialization. Upon successful completion, students were admitted
to the regular faculties. The second reason was that studies at the regular
faculties lasted one year longer than studies at equivalent faculties in the
West. The additional (fifth) year was divided between on-the-job training
and the writing of the diploma thesis (diplomnyi proekt). For this reason,
the first degree awarded by the Soviet university was the Magister. The
exception was again the UDN, in whose faculties studies were, until the mid-
1970s, one year shorter. Nonetheless, UDN awarded a Magister directly to
its graduates—who were also doing their on-the-job training and writing a
master thesis—just like the other Soviet schools of higher education.
Once at the main faculties, Africans and other Third World students
joined the student body and attended the same courses as their Soviet or
Eastern European peers. Nevertheless, as their linguistic skills were still
inadequate, they often had to attend additional courses to improve their
Russian. At the same time, mainly as a consequence of the language gap,
additional efforts were required to assimilate the content of lectures and
21. Transcript of the discussion of 28/02/1964, by S. I. Sohin, Vice-Director of the
Department of Foreign Relations of the Ministry: GARF, f. R-9518, op. 1, d. 546,
l. 47-49.
22. I found no evidence that the events of May 68 spurred the Ministry to take this
decision, although I cannot exclude that they played some role.
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seminars. In practice, these additional efforts meant three things: first, that
the students were taking auxiliary courses in which the lectures were repeated
and explained; second, that they were joining seminars in small groups
whose aim was to tackle the students’ weaknesses; and third, that in the case
of some students, a supervisor, either a faculty member or a Soviet student,
was assigned to assist them. Students who failed to cope and fulfill the
requirements were confronted with measures such as the reduction of their
monthly stipend or transfer to a technical institute. Those charged with
absenteeism, violation of discipline, anti-Soviet behavior, or singled out as
troublemakers, could end up being expelled from the USSR.
Both the auxiliary courses and the disciplinary measures were instituted
in the 1960s, when the dropout rate was particularly high. According to
an analytical report on the UDN, during the period 1960-1968 over 13.8%
or 690 among approximately 5,000 Third World students dropped out, the
majority of them for personal or political reasons and as a consequence of
disciplinary sanctions.23 The picture was very different at an elite school
such as the Moscow Energy Institute (MEI), where, in 1964, the dropout rate
of students from the Third World skyrocketed to 44.1%. In sharp contrast
with the UDN however, the MEI had such an alarming dropout rate because of
its very high academic standards. The enrollment of sometimes ill-prepared
students, often through political channels, created serious problems, which
the MEI faculty members tried to tackle initially through auxiliary courses,
almost doubling the hours of classes the students had to attend. Neverthe-
less, as the dropout rate remained high and as many MEI students were trans-
ferred to other less demanding Soviet schools, the rector took the decision
in 1968 to halt the enrollment of Third World students in most specialized
fields and to concentrate these students in a small number of faculties under
the supervision of chairs (kafedry) especially created for them. In practice,
this meant that Third World students had fewer options to specialize in
different disciplines. It also meant that within the same specialized program
they were attending the same lectures as their Soviets peers, but different
seminars, and that at the end of the courses, they were taking different exams.
This decision sparked protests among the students who feared that “seg-
regation” and the lowering of academic standards would affect their degrees.
But as it reduced the dropout rate dramatically, to 7.8% in 1970, it was not
called into question.24 In December 1974 the head of Central Committee’s
Department of Sciences and Educational Institutes of the CPSU, Sergey
Kolesnikov, praised the decision and encouraged other schools to follow
23. Report of 04/06/1968 by N. Egorov and N. Sofinskij: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 39,
d. 143, l. 10.
24. Report for in-house use by the Vice-Rector S. V. Nadezˇdin, included in the
“secret” issue no 39 of 1975 produced by the Soviet Ministry of Education:
RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 1152, l. 179-188.
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MEI’s example.25 His example, however, was not followed, as at almost all
universities, Africans and all Third World students were studying in the
same programs with their Soviet peers.
In fact, there was no longer cause for special arrangements. During the
1970s and 1980s, the dropout rate had been drastically reduced and generally
limited to the preparatory faculties. Between 1976 and 1981, for instance,
only 3.8% of all Third World students enrolled at the preparatory faculty
of the Kharkov State University interrupted their studies for various reasons
(academic failure, health, personal reasons, disappointment and return etc.).
The rest successfully completed the program, which, for ill-prepared students,
who happened to come from Ethiopia, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville, Yemen and
Afghanistan, included many additional hours of mathematics and natural
sciences.26 As regards the regular faculties, during the academic year
1980-81 only 12 of over 442 students (2.7%) dropped out of the Odessa
Polytechnic Institute and 2 (both Ethiopians) out of 295 (0.7%) of the
Medical School of Crimea.27 The spectacular decrease in the dropout rate
reflected, first and foremost, the improvement of the level of students, who
were selected with stricter academic criteria and through procedures agreed
upon between the Soviet and African governments. Addressing an audience
of Communist Youth (Komsomol) managers, Alexandr Zˇ uganov, Secretary
of the Komsomol USSR, could then affirm that the “average academic level
of foreign students” was “perfectly comparable to the level of Soviet stu-
dents and in certain cases even higher”.28
However, there were other factors that also contributed to the improve-
ment of statistics, such as the favorable treatment of foreigners and the lower
academic standards in certain schools. Serious concerns about the quality
of training, especially of physicians, had been made public both in Africa
and in the West (Dubarry 1980; Patton 1996: 242-244). Soviet internal
accounts also confirmed that the training of physicians at the UDN was inade-
quate and that in a number of schools in Tashkent, Erevan, and Krasnodar
degrees with excellent marks were indeed awarded to unqualified students
(Katsakioris 2015: 202-203). A general decline in academic standards
occurred by the end of the 1980s as a consequence of the Soviet collapse,
and bribery and corruption were reported (Rajaonesy 2000: 178). Serious
as these allegations were, such phenomena should nevertheless not yield to
easy generalizations. During the greater part of the period under survey,
25. Kolesnikov’s speech at a meeting of the Moscow Committee of the CPSU, on
December 4, 1974: RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 1152, l. 158-176.
26. Report of the Rector, N. I. Sazonov, for 1980-1981: GARF, f. 9606, op. 11,
d. 220, l. 3-4, 24-26.
27. Central State Archives of Supreme Bodies of Power and Government of Ukraine
(hereafter TsDAVO), f. 4621, op. 13, d. 6286, l. 3-4 and 6282, l. 1-3 respectively.
28. Speech of 25/04/1981: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 39, d. 815, l. 41.
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and for the majority of the students, studies in the USSR were difficult, seri-
ous, and demanding. If concluding the opposite played into the hands of
Western-educated Africans (Koudawo 1992: 3), it certainly did not do jus-
tice to the Soviet school, nor to its African graduates.
Another important question about the Soviet-African cooperation, as
important as the one of scholarships, was that of specializations. Among
the 481 black Africans who graduated from preparatory faculties in 1962,
143 (29.8%) were to pursue their studies in schools of medicine and pharma-
cology, 128 (26.6%) in engineering, 55 (11.4%) in economics and political
economy, 28 (5.8%) in geology, 25 (5.2%) in agronomy, 17 (3.5%) in phys-
ics and chemistry, 14 (2.9%) in veterinary medicine, 12 (2.5%) in inter-
national relations and the rest (12.3%) in all other fields from mathematics
to literature.29 In the following years, as more students on state scholarships
arrived in the USSR, the percentage of students enrolled in engineering grew
higher, reflecting the desires of both students and their governments, the
latter viewing the training of social or political scientists in the USSR most
often with distrust. For the Soviets, however, training predominantly engi-
neers and physicians, who were less likely to occupy key positions in state
mechanisms, was not serving the purpose of influencing the political course
of African countries. In a report addressed to the CPSU in 1968, the Soviet
Institute of Africa analyzed the issue as follows:
The main orientation [of the training programs] towards the creation of a technical
and medical intelligentsia is not desirable in the future, because it does not always
ensure the broad access of progressive elements into the political and social affairs
of Africa. [...] Revolutionary changes are taking place in Africa for which qualified
and progressive specialists are required in the sphere of administration. Practice
has proven that in all African countries such specialists as economists, administrative
staff, military officers, legal experts, philosophers, journalists, propaganda experts,
teachers and professors constitute the principal pool, from which upper and middle-
rank state employees are recruited.30
However, these policy recommendations were not heeded and, as in the
case of scholarships, an important reason for this was the “resistance” of
African governments. Egypt, which was partly paying for the Soviet educa-
tional services, had been the first country to limit the educational exchange
to just engineering and hard sciences, and other countries followed suit.
Nigeria, which by the second half of the 1960s and until 1975, as a result
of its partnership with Moscow during the Biafra War, became the primary
African exporter of students to the USSR, completely stopped allowing the
departure of holders of non-state scholarships between 1971 and 1975 and
did not send a single student to study social or political sciences in the
USSR. In 1974, Kolesnikov noticed the predominance of engineers (50%)
29. TsDAVO, f. 4621, op. 6, d. 37.
30. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 39, d. 136, l. 85.
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and physicians (20%) and lamented the fact that few “economists, philoso-
phers, journalists and teachers” were being educated in the USSR.31 This
trend, however, went uninterrupted until 1991 when, according to a well-
documented survey, 53% of all foreign students were enrolled in schools
of engineering (Arefiev & Sheregui 2014: 30).32 It is true, of course, that
political training continued in the schools run by the Soviet trade unions
and at the Komsomol, whose graduates were sometimes admitted to ordinary
universities. A third political school, created for party leaders, such as Thabo
Mbeki and John Mahama, future presidents of South Africa and Ghana
respectively, was the Institute of Social Sciences of the Central Committee
of the CPSU. If these three schools carried on the work of universities set
up by the Communist International (COMINTERN) in the interwar years, in the
ordinary universities, political education was limited to the required courses
of political and social sciences mentioned earlier.
In any case, despite the reactions after switching the status of these
courses from options to requirements, the two other major issues, namely
the control over the scholarships and the specializations, were settled in
rather favorable terms for most African governments. As a result, suspicion
gradually dissolved, even vis-à-vis the UDN, giving way to mutual under-
standing and to a “normal” and generally stable state-to-state cooperation.
African governments seemed genuinely to appreciate not only the large num-
ber of scholarships their youths were offered each year, but also the “effi-
ciency” of the Soviets and their sense of organization. Not only were Soviet
authorities able to control the mobility of their nationals and maintain a
very low dropout rate, there was relative calm in the USSR, the absence of
phenomena such as student revolts (like May 1968 in France) and other
Western temptations.
Moreover, the fact that African students in the West very often did not
return to their home countries, while those in the East took a flight back
upon completion of their studies—even if many of them then migrated again
for further studies or work—was also an important argument in an era when
the problem of the “brain drain” was looming large. To be sure, the attitude
toward study in the USSR remained ambivalent and in most countries, the Soviet
Magister never acquired the standing of Western diplomas (Yengo 2011).
This was due to the impact of the cultural policies of Western imperialism,
to anti-communist propaganda, to the dismissive attitude Western-educated
Africans had vis-à-vis their Eastern-educated fellows whose competition for
the same resources they did not welcome, as well as to the shortcomings
31. See RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 1152, l. 101 for Nigeria and l. 161 for Kolesni-
kov’s statement.
32. It should be stressed however that this percentage concerns not only Africans
but all foreign students and that the massive arrival of Ethiopians after the revolu-
tion (1974-1978) may have altered the picture of specializations. This is a point
that requires further research.
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of Soviet African policies. At the same time, however, there existed also,
very clearly, a sense that Soviet educational aid was serving the needs of
Africa, as well as an increased awareness of the merits of the Soviet univer-
sity and of the Soviet-African cooperation.
For all these reasons, despite a few abrupt ups and downs due to regime
change, such as in Ghana (1966), or due to shifts in Soviet alliances, namely
from Somalia to Ethiopia (1976-1977), between 1960 and 1990 the number
of African students in the USSR grew steadily and cooperation expanded to
almost all African countries. Some countries received the lion’s share of the
aid: on one hand, there was socialist Ethiopia, which until December 1991
had trained some 4,841 students in the USSR, followed by Congo-Brazzaville
(4,102), Nigeria (3,606) and Mali (2,559). Ivory Coast and Congo-Kinshasa,
on the other hand, were the two big African countries, which restricted their
cooperation with the USSR to the minimum. Between these two extremes,
however, almost all countries established close ties with Moscow and bene-
fitted from the educational aid. As a result, during the academic year 1985-
1986 in all areas of the USSR, African students were studying in various,
predominantly scientific and technological fields: 527 students from Benin,
241 from Burkina Faso, 234 from Burundi, 136 from Lesotho, 353 from
Mauritania, 452 from Mozambique, 475 from Sierra Leone, 391 from Togo,
183 from Zambia, 353 from Zimbabwe, 475 from Uganda, and other groups
of similar size from most African countries.33
In sharp contrast with Soviet aid to Latin America or Asia, which was
heavily concentrated on Cuba, Vietnam, Mongolia and Afghanistan, diversi-
fication has been a notable feature of Soviet aid to Africa. If this was a
consequence of the absence of a close and long-standing alliance, such as
the one between Moscow and Havana, the fact that the Soviet-educated
Africans were dispersed all around the continent and greatly outnumbered
by their Western-educated colleagues, meant that the political impact of
Soviet educational aid was rather limited. Another important reason—as
the tables in the Appendix illustrate—was that the bulk of the Soviet-
educated specialists returned to their countries of origin during the second
half of the 1980s, at a moment in time when Gorbachev had already decided
on the Soviet retreat from the South and that building socialism in Africa
was no longer on the agenda.

In the three decades of the Soviet-African educational cooperation, which
evolved against the backdrop of the well-established African dependence
on the West and strong competition from Western countries, such a complex
33. For these numbers, see the sources indicated in the notes of the Appendix.
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undertaking as the transfer of the Soviet scientific and political paradigm
through the training of a socialist-minded and pro-Soviet intelligentsia, had
limited although very significant effects. In its early stages, the Ethiopian
revolution occurred with the massive participation of students in Addis Ababa
and, although active in the Ethiopian movement abroad, the few leftists
who had studied in the USSR before 1974-1975, played a rather secondary
role (Zewde 2014). This changed by the late 1980s, when Soviet-educated
Ethiopians occupied 30% of high offices in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and almost 50% in Economic ministries, commissions, and state enterprises.34
The same was true for the Eastern-educated Zanzibaris (Burgess 2007) and
Mozambicans who returned to their countries after independence.
Then that chapter closed and the idea to restructure the African states
along socialist lines was abandoned. Thereafter, not only the collapse of
communism, but also the subsequent dismantling of ties between post-Soviet
Russia and Africa, seemed to vindicate the opinion that the training of Afri-
cans in the USSR failed to produce the intended political effect (Koudawo
1992). Such an ex post facto assessment of thirty years of educational
cooperation from the political standpoint of the immediate post-Cold War
is, however, quite problematic. On the one hand, it fails to consider the
historically and quantitatively unequal terms under which Soviet-African
cooperation developed against the background of Africa’s dependence on
the West. On the other hand, it is too quick to dismiss the potential, in
terms of policy influence and networks, that might have a group of elites
educated elsewhere than in the West might have had, if an alternative poli-
tical and economic model turned out to be relatively efficacious and sus-
tainable.
Speculation is, however, needless, because the Soviet-African educa-
tional cooperation did have major tangible effects, both direct and indirect,
other than the Sovietization of Africa. Historians of US international rela-
tions have meticulously shown how communist involvement spurred the
American government and private foundations to increase their educational
aid to less developed countries and how modernization theorists who, among
others, vigorously advocated the training of Third World elites, embarked
on their “mission” in response to the communist challenge (Gilman 2003;
Engerman et al. 2003; Ekbladh 2010). If this was an indirect effect, the
direct ones were far more significant. Students from the Portuguese colo-
nies, holders of scholarships of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee,
studied medicine in the USSR and served in the front line of anticolonial wars.
34. “Information on the employment of Ethiopian graduates of Soviet institutes of
higher education in the state apparatus of the Popular Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia,” 08/04/1988, based on data of the National Committee for Central
Planning of Ethiopia. By A. Kurov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy
in Addis Ababa: GARF, f. 9661, op. 1, d. 337, l. 1-11.
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More than 5,000 physicians from all over the continent were educated in
the USSR. The “Russia Hospital” in Kisumu, Kenya, the Soviet Red Cross
hospital in Addis Ababa (a gift of Stalin), and many other hospitals in
Somalia, Mali, Ghana and elsewhere were staffed by graduates of Soviet
medical schools. Filmmakers such as Sembène Ousmane, Souleymane Cissé
and Abderrahmane Sissako studied their art in the Soviet Union, as did paint-
ers such as the Malian Mamadou Somé Coulibaly (Davis 2013) and the
Beninese Philippe Abayi, his fellow countryman, the architect Joseph Vinou
(Cohen 2015: 84, 75), as well as award-winning writers such as the Ghanaian
Atukwei Okai and the Malian Gaoussou Diawara. Numerous lawmakers,
ministers and heads of states, as the Somali President Abdiqasim Salad
Hassan, the Angolan José Eduardo dos Santos, the Congolese Isidore Mvouba,
the Namibian Hifikepunye Pohamba also sat on Soviet school benches.
Should Eastern bloc-educated politicians be added, for example, the Kenyan
Raila Odinga who studied in East Germany or the Malian Alpha Oumar
Konaré who studied in Poland, the list would become very long. Beyond
recalling the names of these well-known graduates, this paper has argued
that the credit should first of all go to the thousands of anonymous teachers
and engineers, scientists and agronomists, who studied in the USSR and then
returned to Africa to practice their professions.
“The golden days of diverse scholarships for African students to study
in Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and Belgrade seem to be almost
over and rival scholarships to study in Western countries have been drasti-
cally reduced” Ali Mazrui wrote (1999: 9), adding: “The golden days of
Czech, Hungarian, and Polish professors teaching at African universities are
almost over and resources for Western visiting professors have been drasti-
cally reduced.” This paper concludes, along with Ali Mazrui, in reiterating
that Soviet educational aid has been of great importance both for the devel-
opment of African countries and for several generations of African youth
and that, with proper consideration, it should become clear that its effects,
both direct and indirect, were major.
Bayreuth Academy of Advanced African Studies, Bayreuth (Germany).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1. — STUDENTS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA IN THE MAJOR HOST COUNTRIES,
1962-1991
Year France USA USSR UK West Germany
1962 3,895 3,540 1,027 3,394 948
1963 3,538 4,484 1,288 3,288 962
1964 4,175 5,079 2,177 3,209 1,103
1965 4,036 5,333 2,794 3,347 1,204
1966 4,117 5,680 2,829 3,377 1,270
1967 4,347 5,613 3,272 3,299 1,171
1968 4,444 5,610 4,309 2,840 1,230
1969 5,151 5,928 4,458 4,723 1,158
1970 - 6,886 4,459 4,776 1,164
1971 6,423 7,759 4,267 4,697 1,178
1972 - 9,366 4,277 4,753 -
1973 12,338 10,674 4,661 - -
1974 14,083 15,670 5,027 6,745 1,593
1975 16,979 21,840 5,120 7,992 2,169
1976 18,631 21,663 6,331 9,261 2,112
1977 20,865 23,885 8,120 10,164 2,210
1978 22,193 27,790 9,799 10,276 2,222
1979 24,053 29,142 11,110 9,836 2,163
1980 24,405 - 12,627 9,520 2,267
1981 - 27,313 13,808 9,582 -
1982 30,045 - 14,259 - 2,452
1983 30,795* - 15,318 7,952 2,654
1984 31,513 28,235 16,571 7,629 -
1985 - 24,212 17,378 7,725 2,853
1986 30,132 23,051 18,118 - 2,869
1987 29,254 23,080 19,410 7,473 -
1988 28,532 18,564 20,904 7,594 3,161
1989 32,092 17,887 22,719 8,023 -
1990 27,503 17,264 23,809 7,975 3,762
1991 27,191 17,819 18,336 8,016 4,160
* Students from Egypt, Libya and Sudan are exceptionally included.
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Data in this table, as well as in Tables 2, 3 and 4, illustrate the aggregate number
of students who were studying in the host countries during the year indicated. This
means that the same student is counted in four or five subsequent years. Students
at military or political schools are not included. As regards the USSR, data come
from the annual tables the Soviet Ministry of Education was compiling each year,
as a rule, between November and December. For the academic years (school terms)
1980-81 and 1984-85, I did not find annual tables. To calculate the number of
students for these two years, I used the data of the previous year, deduced the
number of students who were expected to graduate, and added the number of the
newly-enrolled ones. This means that the data for these two academic years are
approximate. See GARF, f. R-9606, op. 1, d. 521, l. 42-43, d. 869, l. 42-45,
d. 1638, l. 9-12, d. 1948, l. 1-4, d. 2369, l. 6-7a, d. 2381, l. 1-6, d. 2699, l. 1-5,
d. 3090, l. 1-6, d. 3533, l. 1-6, d. 3957, l. 1-6, d. 4387, l. 1-6, d. 5938, l. 1-6, d. 6485,
l. 1-6, d. 6841, l. 1-8, d. 7244, l. 1-8, d. 7663, l. 1-7, d. 8151, l. 2-6, d. 8660, l. 17-
21, d. 9122, l. 7-11, d. 9524, l. 1-8, d. 10011, l. 1-5, and op. 3, d. 608, l. 4-10, d. 984,
l. 8-14, d. 1368, l. 6-10, d. 1723, l. 1-7. Also GARF, f. R-9661, op. 1, d. 335, l. 7-
13, d. 589, l. 1-7, d. 772, l. 1-6, d. 851, l. 3-10. And RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8,
d. 1152, l. 104. As regards the other countries, data come from the three volumes
of UNESCO, entitled Statistics of Students Abroad 1962-1968, 1969-1973 and 1974-
1978, as well as from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook of every year from 1979
to 1993. As it is noticed in all UNESCO yearbooks, data provided “are to be
considered as indicative.” Data on foreign students in France, for instance, are
clearly underestimated, because as a rule they did not include “students enrolled at
institutions considered... as non-university (‘grandes écoles’, ‘classes préparatoires
aux grandes écoles’ and ‘sections de techniciens supérieurs’).” Closer to the Soviet
data are those on foreign students in the UK, which include “foreign students
enrolled at universities (for full-time study or research), technical colleges (advanced
courses) and colleges of education.” For the US it should be noted that the data
of UNESCO are lower compared to those of the New York Institute of International
Education, yet the latter also include students at military colleges and academies.
For this reason, I chose to use UNESCO’s data. (-) means no data.
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TABLE 2. — STUDENTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES OF WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA



















































































59-60 1 0 13 0 3 14 62 1 4 5 3 6 7
60-61 1 0 38 0 6 108 69 9 20 27 7 22 20
61-62 6 2 66 0 64 211 110 21 102 62 19 29 39
62-63 7 2 58 0 79 358 89 17 203 69 16 30 32
63-64 47 7 86 0 60 513 156 23 152 220 27 47 53
64-65 44 11 96 7 80 543 154 29 148 180 23 59 60
65-66 51 9 88 12 101 470 185 28 160 287 24 58 60
66-67 55 9 93 117 49 425 96 25 173 392 17 108 58
67-68 64 6 119 288 45 357 178 35 210 615 16 257 58
68-69 64 6 115 277 64 284 92 42 249 668 32 310 63
69-70 54 15 99 291 60 208 29 52 213 749 41 346 73
70-71 37 25 90 294 41 126 70 56 217 783 52 350 68
71-72 26 40 65 327 75 69 64 60 220 797 81 326 81
72-73 36 76 53 522 69 36 59 41 227 734 131 292 115
73-74 49 113 50 595 78 40 75 34 302 715 152 239 135
74-75 75 133 62 557 15 73 113 102 274 686 175 192 161
75-76 121 174 123 792 36 147 300 112 337 706 215 173 179
76-77 188 218 151 923 47 240 460 131 488 698 206 181 218
77-78 238 272 160 1,088 48 309 690 138 499 781 191 220 267
78-79 314 293 160 1,123 48 412 788 122 635 861 184 244 292
79-80 345 263 160 1,276 45 481 892 98 702 963 173 313 325
80-81 377 301 126 1,303 52 543 927 56 719 1,058 130 346 325
81-82 424 210 89 1,396 59 626 659 21 723 1,124 104 420 355
82-83 484 159 47 1,467 64 710 521 6 764 1,102 104 418 372
83-84 480 127 26 1,540 57 778 484 4 814 1,007 114 463 384
84-85 518 188 50 1,474 71 759 374 9 893 1,119 124 478 388
85-86 527 241 115 1,481 84 865 327 15 1,074 1,162 135 475 391
86-87 587 250 192 1,582 110 912 410 18 1,252 1,518 151 468 406
87-88 576 383 246 1,628 146 949 501 39 1,392 1,348 102 545 391
88-89 652 530 298 1,663 172 970 583 43 1,561 1,543 223 625 411
89-90 690 638 347 1,708 190 1,087 637 52 1,621 1,650 235 666 406
90-91 560 491 321 1,31 140 846 430 43 1,318 1,320 229 415 337
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TABLE 3. — STUDENTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES OF EASTERN, CENTRAL EAST,
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1959-1991
































































59-60 0 4 6 0 0 0 23 1 1 0 0
60-61 13 11 9 0 1 7 25 2 5 2 1
61-62 27 38 11 0 4 22 118 3 11 3 9
62-63 48 105 7 0 5 40 131 4 11 4 5
63-64 106 160 27 2 14 49 293 8 27 24 10
64-65 351 200 46 27 15 65 324 5 33 33 19
65-66 311 194 52 29 26 62 322 3 36 35 26
66-67 453 239 85 41 38 71 371 3 42 31 15
67-68 470 236 191 67 72 101 499 7 62 30 36
68-69 448 203 216 87 96 120 441 9 69 25 32
69-70 333 164 258 97 118 193 397 14 75 21 28
70-71 203 134 253 110 121 214 328 20 86 15 20
71-72 151 130 241 115 125 263 283 20 96 19 16
72-73 143 153 222 138 145 291 264 39 114 23 19
73-74 158 209 192 123 163 324 250 84 119 19 23
74-75 134 284 167 108 161 345 196 102 115 19 18
75-76 133 311 171 109 169 328 236 174 115 23 27
76-77 178 418 202 122 174 647 284 234 115 28 42
77-78 207 478 237 125 178 923 335 378 126 49 49
78-79 256 546 298 129 172 1,223 94 608 122 74 69
79-80 294 547 320 120 145 1,595 76 869 93 73 122
80-81 313 572 344 131 144 1,880 74 989 116 93 144
81-82 317 591 362 138 134 2,139 76 1,279 130 106 166
82-83 315 626 384 162 152 2,453 46 1,434 143 150 241
83-84 300 649 414 182 185 2,733 40 1,555 153 159 302
84-85 291 644 460 198 195 2,790 36 1,615 166 132 344
85-86 266 672 475 234 475 3,020 45 1,579 178 126 353
86-87 223 590 461 275 290 3,142 39 1,518 206 102 376
87-88 204 609 408 319 305 3,322 82 1,501 207 87 374
88-89 199 636 448 341 339 3,442 172 1,574 227 60 366
89-90 182 618 499 365 359 3,484 201 1,624 221 49 307
90-91 131 486 335 296 280 2,448 151 1,260 170 16 223
* For the period 1959-1964, students from Zanzibar are added to those from Tanganyika.
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TABLE 4. — STUDENTS FROM THE PORTUGUESE-SPEAKING AFRICAN COUNTRIES








































1960-61 0 2 0 0
1961-62 6 6 0 0
1962-63 4 6 0 0
1963-64 42 42 8 0
1964-65 88 23 5 0
1965-66 53 38 11 0
1966-67 68 74 16 0
1967-68 76 33 18 0
1968-69 57 33 16 0
1969-70 42 71 14 0
1970-71 37 12 14 0
1971-72 44 26 10 0
1972-73 41 67 8 0
1973-74 36 72 8 0
1974-75 32 138 5 0
1975-76 29 155 43 6 0
1976-77 88 125 92 6 3
1977-78 152 128 123 95 1
1978-79 177 135 126 96 9
1979-80 304 172 156 95 30
1980-81 385 213 139 110 42
1981-82 451 273 119 128 74
1982-83 610 337 123 239 108
1983-84 875 459 133 368 147
1984-85 860 486 167 335 144
1985-86 1,033 541 149 452 151
1986-87 1,346 622 173 582 150
1987-88 1,604 654 208 694 157
1988-89 1,938 704 211 657 161
1989-90 2,018 720 275 743 166
1990-91 1,701 563 211 582 127
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Angola 51 113 645 1,531 2,228
Benin 44 128 532 910 1,131
Burkina Faso 5 136 376 449 588
Burundi 27 200 332 476 575
Cameroon 108 205 381 409 509
Cape Verde - 8 190 301 382
Central African Republic 7 364 373 382 382
Chad 1 264 603 834 940
Congo-Brazzaville 112 1,057 2,588 3,580 4,102
Congo-Kinshasa 56 127 198 233 272
Ethiopia 51 450 2,089 3,782 4,841
Equatorial Guinea 0 101 242 313 401
Ghana 444 626 1,146 1,708 2,002
Guinea Bissau 68 258 580 1,073 1,322
Guinea Conakry 126 272 1,095 1,507 1,821
Ivory Coast 33 145 228 230 243
Kenya 318 611 864 1,068 1,144
Madagascar - 129 964 1,848 2,401
Mali 167 597 1,394 1,996 2,559
Mauritania 3 117 413 651 770
Mauritius 48 210 351 454 531
Mozambique 14 27 232 640 880
Niger 46 117 249 286 340
Nigeria 304 1,344 2,374 3,133 3,606
Rwanda 31 228 416 566 681
São Tomé and Príncipe 0 0 57 153 207
Senegal 21 44 374 435 510
Sierra Leone 66 507 851 1,183 1,343
Somalia 302 720 772 815 831
South Africa 30 68 135 230 241
Tanzania 236 494 996 1,399 1,599
Togo 56 210 573 846 993
Uganda 60 364 60 914 1,033
Zambia 15 126 316 443 492
Zimbabwe 24 60 245 472 583
TOTAL 2,921 10,579 24,429 36,146 43,562Sub-Saharan Africa
* For the years 1990 and 1991, I did not find exact data on graduates. I thus used the
data on students who were “expected to graduate.”
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the history of the Soviet-African educational cooperation during
the Cold War and focuses mainly on the training of African students at Soviet universi-
ties. It analyzes the ideas, aspirations and motives that governed the cooperation
both in Africa and in the USSR. As regards the African side of the interaction, it
draws a distinction between different actors, such as governments, opposition parties,
national liberation movements and student organizations. Contrary to many assump-
tions and stereotypes, the paper downplays the importance of Marxist-Leninist indoc-
trination. It argues that the training programmes aimed to educate, not only “friends”
of the Soviet Union, but notably qualified specialists who would both embody and
defend the superiority of socialism and of the Soviet university system. By the end
of the 1960s, most African governments had managed to impose their control over
and their own criteria for the selection of students. This made Soviet aid even more
attractive. The conclusion traces the impact of Soviet aid on Africa. The Appendix
provides new data on African students in the USSR, on returning students, as well
as suggestive comparative data on African students in major host countries.
RÉSUMÉ
La création d’une intelligentsia socialiste : la subvention des études universitaires
soviétiques et son impact sur l’Afrique, 1960-1991. — L’article examine l’histoire de
la coopération éducative entre l’URSS et l’Afrique pendant la Guerre froide, se
concentre sur la formation des cadres africains dans les universités soviétiques, et
analyse les idées, les aspirations et les motivations qui orientaient la coopération
aussi bien en Afrique qu’en URSS. Loin de tout monolithisme, il distingue du côté
africain, les différents acteurs : gouvernements, partis d’opposition, mouvements de
libération nationale et organisations étudiantes. Et du côté de l’URSS, à l’encontre
des stéréotypes, il dédramatise l’importance de l’endoctrinement marxiste-léniniste ;
l’objectif des formations n’était en effet pas seulement de faire des étudiants des
« amis » de l’URSS, mais aussi de former de bons spécialistes qui défendraient et
surtout prouveraient grâce à leurs connaissances la supériorité du socialisme et de
l’université soviétique. Vers la fin des années 1960, la plupart des gouvernements
africains avaient réussi à imposer leur contrôle et leurs critères sur la sélection des
étudiants, ce qui rendit l’aide de l’URSS encore plus attractive. La conclusion évoque
l’impact de l’aide soviétique en Afrique, notamment sur la formation des élites. En
annexe, des données inédites sur les effectifs des étudiants africains formés en URSS
selon le pays d’origine, sur le retour des diplômés dans leur pays, ainsi que des
données comparatives sur les étudiants africains dans les plus grands pays d’accueil.
Keywords/Mots-clés : Soviet Union, African students, Cold War, cooperation,
education/Union soviétique, étudiants africains, Guerre froide, coopération,
formation.
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